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Introduction 
Perhaps, one element of colonialism that most traumatized the Gold Coast before independence is the fact that 
native or customary law was tagged ‘foreign’ and subjected to customarily unknown tests of validity. This fact 
gave Gold Coasters, and particularly nationalists, intense nausea and goose pimples.  Indeed, for the nationalists 
in the Gold Coast, English law was, or at least ought to have been considered as, the guest of the indigenous 
customary law. However, the British regarded the received English law as the common law of Ghana and viewed 
native customary law as foreign and unknown. The native customary law therefore had to be proved as any other 
fact before it could be accepted as a rule of law.  
Smith J, an English judge in the Gold Coast, held in Hughes v Davies and Another
2
 that "[a]s native law is 
foreign law it must be proved as any other fact." 
It was a matter of grave concern for all nationalists and local jurists that native law was regarded as foreign in its 
own land of origin. Rejecting that misunderstood view in his Fante Customary Law, John Mensah Sarbah (1884) 
Sar FCL 265 had this to say:  
 "It cannot, therefore, be correct to say, as has sometimes been said, that the native laws   and 
customs are foreign matters which, unless proved, cannot be recognised or noticed  by a judge." 
In the celebrated case of in Angu v Attah
3
 the Privy Council stated that: 
 "As is the case with all customary law, it has to be proved in the first instance by calling  witnesses 
acquainted with the native customs until the particular customs have, by  frequent proof in the courts 
become so notorious that the courts take judicial notice of  them." 
This rather supposedly bizarre view of the indigenous customary law became known as the rule in Angu v Attah. 
This treatment of the customary law was not only disliked by jurists; it was vehemently opposed by politicians 
and nationalists. Dr Kwame Nkrumah so robustly inspired African jurists and nationalists to quickly find a way 
of reversing what he described as “travesty of the local custom” which had been made foreign in its own land of 
origin. In venting his spleen at this mischaracterization of the indigenous customary law as exotic law, Dr 
Kwame Nkrumah, in his usual nationalistic posture, made the following comments in his address at the formal 
opening of the Accra Conference of Legal Education and of the Ghana Law School on 4th January 1963: 
 "African law in Africa was declared foreign law for the convenience of colonial  administration which 
found the administration of justice cumbersome by reason of the  vast variations in local and tribal 
customs. African law had to be proved by experts. But  no law can be foreign in its own land and country 
and African lawyers, particularly in the  independent African States, must quickly find a way to reverse this 
judicial travesty."
4
 
 From the foregoing words of outrage, one may ask whether the Colonial masters, and for that matter the English 
Jurists, were entirely wrong in characterizing native law as exotic. Differently put, were the colonial masters 
justified in treating native law as a question of fact? I propose to attempt a justification of the much-criticised 
rule in Angu v Attah (supra).  
 
Justification for the Rule 
The rule that native custom had to be strictly proved as any other fact could be justified in a number of ways. 
The foremost justification is that, since the foreign judges administering the law before and after Angu v 
Attah(supra) were not personally knowledgeable in native custom and having regard to the "the vast variations 
in local and tribal customs" (as admitted in Dr Nkrumah’s statement), the colonial masters may be said to be 
right in treating customary law as a question of fact, and not a question of law. The rule avoided any attempt by 
native litigants to put anything up in argument as a rule of customary law. Proof of customary law by experts 
was therefore necessary, hence the rule in Angu v Attah(supra). 
Another justification for the rule is that even modern Ghanaian judges cannot make any claim to universal 
knowledge of customary law in Ghana. Customary practices in Ghana differ from one community to the other
.5
 
                                                           
1 The author is a Part One student of the Ghana School of Law, Accra Main Campus.  
2 (1909) Ren 550 at 551 
3 (1916) PC `24-'28, 43 
4  Cited by David A Nii-Aponsah in The Rule In Angu V Attah Revisited [1987-88] VOL. XVI  RGL 281—292 
5Article 11 (3) of the 1992 Constitution defines customary law in the following terms: “For the purposes of this article, 
"customary law" means the rules of law, which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana.”(author’s 
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Thus customary law, unlike other components of law, is community specific. The rule that customary law was to 
be treated as foreign law on its own soil must have been made for the benefit of the expatriate colonial judges 
who were deemed to be ignorant of the rules of customary law, hence the insistence on frequent proof of 
customary law so that the court might take judicial notice of them. Although the rule was subjected to criticism 
on national grounds, there is no doubt that the doctrine of judicial ignorance of customary law contributed much 
to the process which led to the recording of customary law in the pages of the law reports.
1
 No one judge can 
honestly claim to be abreast of all existing customary laws in Ghana today. How then can we condemn the 
characterization of customary law as a question of fact by customarily unsophisticated foreign judges? It is 
submitted that the rule was necessary in the utmost interest of justice. 
The rule concerned itself with the mode of ascertaining alleged customary law rules and did not seek to relegate 
local customary law as foreign law. It may be argued that what the foreign judges sought to know was the nature, 
scope and effect of alleged customary practices.  
More importantly, the foreign judges believed the existence of native customary law. If this were not so, they 
would not have proposed or accepted any offer to prove the existence of any alleged customary law. They would 
have totally barred any attempt to have the existence of alleged customary law proved.  All that they sought to do 
was that, being not personally acquainted with the local custom, its existence needed to be proved by experts in 
cogent and satisfactory manner. 
It has been suggested that the rule itself has shown a remarkable resilience, viability and indestructibility and 
now rules from its supposed grave and its apparition steals daily into the courts to haunt them
2
. 
 
THE RULE LIVES ON TODAY  
The independent Ghana has made several attempts to abolish the rule with the view to raising the local custom to 
a revered status of law properly so called. These attempts have received legislative footing. When the time came 
for the colonial Courts Ordinance to be replaced by the Courts Act, 1960,
3
  it was easy for the legislature to 
purport a change of the rule. Under the new law, the court was given the discretion to consult recognised 
textbooks, refer to reported cases or to order the holding of an inquiry if it entertained any doubt as to the content 
or existence of any rule of customary law.
4
   
Section 55(1) of Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459) states that: “Any question as to existence or content of a rule of 
customary law is a question of law for the court and not a question of fact.” The Evidence Decree
5
, provides that 
all questions of law are to be decided by the court.  
Haunted by the ‘doubtful’ nature of native customary law and the existence of variations in local custom, the 
draftsmen legislated in section 55(2) of Act 459 that: 
“If there is doubt as to the existence or content of a rule of customary law relevant in any proceedings before a 
court, the court may adjourn the proceedings to enable an inquiry to be made under subsection (3) of this 
section after the court has considered submissions made by or on behalf of the parties and after the court has 
considered reported cases, textbooks and other sources that may be appropriate to the proceedings.”
6
 
Particularly interesting is section 55(4) which states that: 
“The court may request a House of Chiefs, Divisional or Traditional Council or other body with knowledge of 
the customary law in question to state its opinion which may be laid before the inquiry in written form.” 
These provisions had earlier been enacted in Acts/Decrees like Courts Act
7
; Courts (Amendment) Decree
8
; 
Courts (Amendment) (No. 2) Decree
9
; Courts (Amendment) Law
10
, etc. From these provisions, it is manifestly 
clear that even in modern times, there is still a great measure of uncertainty in the contents of native customary 
law. It is still possible that a particular custom may not be found from any identifiable source. In such cases, the 
court has the discretion to make an inquiry to ascertain the fact of the alleged customary practice. This practice 
gives rise to duality of test for ascertaining the existence of customary law. It cannot therefore be said that any 
question as to existence or content of a rule of customary law is a question of law for the court and not a question 
of fact. In support of this view, the case of Fulani And Another v. Issah
11
 is instructive. In this case the trial 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
emphasis) 
1 Professor Ekow Daniels W C, Development Of Customary Law [1991-92] VOL. XVIII RGL 68—94 
2 David A Nii-Aponsah in The Rule In Angu V Attah Revisited [1987-88] VOL. XVI  RGL 281—292  
3 CA 9. See also The Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), s. 50. 
4 Professor Ekow Daniels W C, Development Of Customary Law [1991-92] VOL. XVIII RGL 68—94 
5 1975 (NRCD 323) 
6 Author’s emphasis 
7 1971 (Act 372) 
8 1972 (NLCD 101) 
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10 1987 (PNDCL. 191) 
11 [1980] GLR 319-332 
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magistrate had based his decision on expert evidence of Fulani customary law in determining the true father of a 
child born out of wedlock. In allowing the appeal, the court held that: 
 “It is my view, therefore, that in the proceedings such as there were before the trial court, it was for the court to 
determine the existence or otherwise of a particular customary law, namely, Fulani customary law or the content 
of a rule of such customary law, after having heard the parties, consulted text-books and other sources as the 
magistrate may consider appropriate; and it is only when the court is still in doubt after such exercise that he 
may hold an inquiry and perhaps seek the assistance of an expert on that particular system of customary 
law.”
1
 
This dual test of ascertaining customary law has found pronouncement in many cases in Ghana
2
. There seems to 
be a confused method for ascertainment of customary law in Ghana. Order 11 rule 11(2) of the High Court (Civil 
Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47) states that: “Where the party pleading relies on a rule of customary law, the 
rule shall be stated in the pleading with sufficient particulars to show the nature and effect of the rule in question 
and the geographical area and ethnic group to which it relates.” This provision is the same as that which was 
contained in the colonial statutes. For instance, The High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 which states: 
" In all cases in which the party pleading relies upon a native law or custom, the native law or custom relied 
upon shall be stated in the pleading with sufficient particulars to show the nature and effect of the native law or 
custom in question and the geographical area and the tribe or tribes to which it relates." 
There also seems to be a resurfacing of the repugnancy test. Under article 26(2) of the 1992 Constitution, it is 
provided that: “All customary practices which dehumanise or are injurious to the physical and mental well being 
of a person are prohibited.” The word ‘injurious’ may be taken to mean ‘repugnant’ to acceptable principles of 
good health. The 1992 Constitution itself admits that not all customary practices pass the test of legality. Before 
any custom passes as customary law, it still has to satisfy certain yardsticks. For instance, section 69A of 
Criminal and Other Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) expressly outlaws female genital mutilation, a practice which is 
still largely and openly accepted in certain parts of the country as a custom.   
Conclusion  
The purported attempt to abolish the rule in Angu v Attah (supra) must reveal the unguarded chauvinistic instinct 
of the independent Ghana and a desire to disassociate with anything done by the colonial administration. This is 
an amazing infidelity to the rule as stated. The seemingly unsuccessful attempts of the draftsmen to toll the 
death-knell of the rule in Angu v Attah(supra) as demonstrated in section 55 of the Courts Act
3
, sounds the bell 
of vindication of the English judges who were practically ‘foreign’ to the customary practices of Ghanaians. It is 
suggested that the mode of ascertainment of customary law in Ghana is a question of both law and fact.  
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